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. Exhibit "C"

Plaintiff/Appellant

William

V,

Penney

("Penney")

hereby

submits the following REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT•

All

references "R." are to the district court record.
DISPUTED FACTS
1. Penney disagrees with defendants' repeated assertion1 that
it is undisputed that Penney voluntarily resigned.

However, a

prima facie case has been made by sworn affidavits of Penney and of
the defendants and by the defendants' express written admissions
that a) Penney never resigned but only threatened to, which threat
was NEVER

accompanied

by any specific date on which any such

termination would be effective; b) defendant Williams considered
and discussed with defendant E-Systems' management firing Penney
before the issue of resignation was ever raised; c)

defendant

Williams had already decided to fire Penney before the issue of
resignation

was

ever

raised; d) that

defendants

Williams

and

Buchanan, together with Penney's immediate supervisor Mr. Cocke,
determined

the

firing

date

of

Penney

and

Penney's

immediate

supervisor Mr. Cocke "filled in '18 June 1986' as the effective
date of ..." Penney's termination.2
1

See BRIEF OF APPELLEES, p. 27, f 2.

2

Penney testified under oath that, after he had firmly pled
his position in the June 18, 1986 meeting (before the issue of
resignation ever came up) , defendant Williams immediately fired
Penney, saying, "It's all over. You're out of here." See Verified
Complaint, R.2-20, f 33.
Penney further testified that
"[he]
NEVER indicated to any of Defendants any DATE on which [Penney]
would resign nor did [Penney] ever have any intention to resign.
The 'effective date of ... resignation' listed on the Letter of
Resignation was NOT filled in by nor at the request of [Penney] BUT
rather was filled in by [Penney]'s supervisor Mr. J. G. Cocke,
contrary to the desire of [Penney]. ... Defendant Williams [had]
-1-

2.
had

no

Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion3 that Penney
written

employment

contract

with

defendant

E-Systems.

However, Penney testified and defendants have admitted that there
was an employment contract between Penney and defendant E-Systems
with

specific

express

written

terms

and

conditions

by

which

defendants considered Penney legally bound.4
... 'frequently threaten[ed] to fire [Penney] if every goal was not
met and schedules not met." First Affidavit of William V. Penney,
R.576 II 13-15.
Defendants admit:
"... the termination of [Penney]'s
employment was discussed by management prior to his resignation.
Shortly after the meeting on June 18, 1986, ... Mr. Williams and
Mr. Cocke had discussions about what disciplinary action to take as
a result of [Penney]'s unacceptable and insubordinate conduct.
After deliberation, Mr. Cocke recommended to Mr. Williams that
[Penney] be terminated. Mr. Williams concurred ... Mr. Cocke also
consulted with Mr. Buchanan, who likewise thought that termination
would be the appropriate disciplinary action."
See Addendum to
Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, Exhibit "A", pp. 38-39, Response No.
54.

Defendant Williams testified:
"After the meeting was
terminated (before the issue of resignation was raised), Jim Cocke
and I had a separate meeting to consider alternatives and
appropriate action in response to the actions of Mr. Penney in the
meeting.
During that (second) meeting, we discussed possible
alternatives including termination of Mr. Penney for rules
violations (refusing to follow instructions and insubordination)
..." Affidavit of David A. Williams, R.481, I 7.
Defendants further admit: "Also in anticipation of the June
18 meeting, [Penney] drafted a letter of resignation, and left the
date of resignation space blank. ... Cocke, [Penney's] boss, filled
in '18 June 1986' as the effective date of [Penney's]" termination.
Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Their Motion For Summary
Judgment, R.437-471, II 9 & 11; Brief of Appellees, p. 29, 1 2 .
3

See BRIEF OF APPELLEES, p. 8, I 1, line 4.

4

Penney gave uncontroverted testimony that defendant ESystems had a specific policy on exempt overtime and "was not
complying with its own policy on exempt overtime" with respect to
Penney.
Verified Complaint, R.2-20, I 19.
Penney testified
-2-

3.

Penney

"plaintiff, while
discovery."5

disagrees

with

represented

Penney's

former

by

defendants'

assertion

that

counsel,

conducted

extensive

attorney L.

Zane Gill

commenced

discovery with Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories & Request for
Production of Documents on July 11, 1990 (R.21-23) and also served
on

10/2/1990

a Notice

of

Taking

of

Deposition

of

defendants

Williams and Buchanan (R.70-71). When defendants finally responded
to

Penney's

Interrogatories

on

9/26/1990,

the

responses

were

riddled with objections, incomplete responses, and filled with
promises to produce documents which Penney has never received6.
(Verified Complaint R.2-20, f 17) and defendants admitted (Answer
R. 33-45, f 17) that "As a director, [Penney] received annual
physicals."
Defendants admit (Brief of Appellees, p. 19 n 12, 14) that
defendant E-Systems had a specific and express "procedure for
converting [E-Systems' insurance] to an individual life insurance
policy upon termination [which was] set forth in E-Systems7 PRU-OPT
Plan
..."
Defendants
admitted
(Addendum
to
Brief
of
Plaintiff/Appellant, Exhibit "A", Responses No. 31, 32, 44, 46, 47,
49 & 52) that E-Systems had written corporate directives for
"terminations" (Directive No. 200.4), for "performance appraisals"
and "merit increases" (Directive No. 200.6), for "severance pay"
(Directive No. 200.3), for "treatment of disabled" (Directive No.
200.42), for "business conduct and ethics" (Directive No. 200.46).
Indeed, defendants admitted that E-Systems has a "Corporate Policy
Manual" which they promised "to produce ... at a time and place
mutually convenient to counsel." Id., Response No. 23.
It is NOTEWORTHY that there does NOT exist and that defendants
have not produced any statement by Penney or other evidence that
demonstrates that Penney was an "at-will" employee of defendant ESystems or that there was no written employment contract.
5

Brief of Appellees, p. 13, n 4.

6

Defendants promised: "Defendants will produce a copy of the
E-Systems Corporate Policy Manual at a time and place mutually
convenient to counsel." Addendum to Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant,
Exhibit "A", Response No. 23. Penney has not received said manual
from Defendants.
-3-

Shortly

after

serving

the Notice

of

Taking

of

Deposition

of

defendants Williams and Buchanan, said depositions were continued
to accommodate the schedules of defendants and/or their counsel and
defendants have utterly

failed to make defendants Williams or

Buchanan available for deposition•

Shortly thereafter, Mr. L. Zane

Gill, Esq. withdrew as counsel for Penney (R.156-157), leaving him
to represent himself Pro Se (R.158-163).7
4.

Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion8 that Penney

has failed to point to any admissible evidence which would allow a
reasonable

fact finder to conclude that defendants engaged

in

outrageous conduct, and, thus, Penney has failed to raise any
genuine issue of fact re Penney's claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.

However, Penney made a prima facie case9 as

7

Defendants's saying "while represented by counsel" is
misleading. While Penney was living in Texas, was not represented
by counsel and was recovering from major surgery, defendants, over
the objections of Penney, scheduled a hearing of Defendants' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment of which defendants state: "The trial
court went ahead with the hearing on June 19, 1992 ... at which it
granted defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
dismissed plaintiff's first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of
action with prejudice. R.416, 420-22.
Plaintiff did not
participate in the hearing in person or via telephone.
R.416.
(See Brief of Appellees, p. 13, n 4.)
8

See Brief of Appellees, p. 22 J[ 2, p. 23 f 3.

9

Penney testified that "on May 9, 1986 [he] was run off the
road in a hit and run accident", Verified Complaint, R.2-20, that
"As a result of the accident, [Penney] was in extreme pain." Id.,
R.2-20, ffl 27 & 28; First Affidavit of William V. Penney, R.573585, 5 11.
Penney further testified that "Williams had never shown any
toleration for health problems. Williams would make fun of those
with health problems including [Penney]. On one occasion Williams
had commented regarding an employee down with back trouble, "Well
-4-

follows:
a.

Defendant Williams, acting individually and on behalf of
defendant E-Systems as the general manager of its Montek
Division, intentionally, wilfully, and maliciously acted
repeatedly and over a prolonged period of time toward
Penney so as to cause him the maximum emotional stress
possible.

b.

The intentional, wilful, and malicious conduct
defendant Williams was outrageous in the extreme.

c.

Penney suffered severe emotional distress and substantial
physical suffering as a direct and proximate result of
the intentional, wilful, and malicious conduct of

of

hell, there's nothing wrong with his hands. Send the work over
there and make him do it in bed." Verified Complaint, R.2-20, fl
16; First Affidavit of William V. Penney, R.573-585, f 11.
Penney testified that in response to his request for sick
leave or vacation time off to have medical treatment for injuries
sustained in a June 18, 1986 automobile accident, defendant
"Williams enumerated the projects upon [Penney] was working at that
time and informed [Penney] that he had the option of completing the
projects or losing his jobs." Verified Complaint, R.2-20, f 30.
"[Penney] (was forced to) continue to work for the next five
or six weeks in extreme pain." Id., f 31.
Penney testified that "The [defendant E-Systems] was not
complying with its own policy on exempt overtime."
Id., f 19.
Penney further testified that he was forced by Williams to "work
extremely long hours" (Id., f 14), "to work ... tremendous number
of hours" (Id., f 17), that Penney told defendant Williams that
Penney 7 s health "was deteriorating due to the vast number of
overtime hours Williams was forcing [Penney] to work." id., fl 21.
Penney testified that "In 1986 [Penney's physical showed
skipped heartbeats and other signs of stress induced by the
tremendous number of hours he had be [forced to work]" and that
Penney's health "was deteriorating due to the vast number of
overtime hours Williams was forcing [Penney] to work." Jd., ff 17
& 21.
Defendants admitted that "[Penney] may have sometimes worked
long hours".
Answer, R.33-45, f 14. Defendants also admitted
that, when they fired Penney, he had "accrued approximately 40.04
hours of vacation leave and approximately 240 hours of sick leave."
Addendum to Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, Exhibit "A", f 63.
-5-

defendant Williams.
Defendants intentional, wilful, and malicious acts in denying an
injured and suffering employee (Penney) any opportunity to seek
medical treatment upon penalty of losing his job, and in attempting
to coerce and intimidate Penney into resigning by forcing him in
his injured and painful state work tremendous numbers of hours of
overtime to the point of deteriorating his health, all the while
mocking and making fun of him for his disability, injury and pain,
certainly is outrageous conduct sufficient to make out a prima
facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
5.

Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion10 that Penney

does not even claim he was asked to do or participate in anything
fraudulent in connection with the General Electric contract and
that the events leading up to Penney's resignation had nothing to
do with the General Electric Contract.

Penney testified and

defendants admit11 that "GE agreed to [and did] pay for" certain
nuclear certified material.

Penney testified that these nuclear

certified materials, which were then "owned by General Electric",12
were being illegally sold by defendant E-Systems to third parties.
Penney was terminated by defendants, at least in part, because
defendant E-Systems' management, including defendant David A.
Williams,

became

aware

that

Penney

knew

of

these

See Brief of Appellees, p. 31, n. 22; p. 35 \ 1.
See BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, p. 34 J 3.
See Verified Complaint, R. 2-20, \ 59.a.
-6-

illegal

activities, was likely to expose defendants' illegal activities,
AND WOULD REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY CONCEALMENT OR COVERUP OF
THESE ILLEGAL ACTS,
6.

Penney

disagrees

with

defendants'

assertion13

that

Northrup was fully aware of all sourcing changes made under the
Northrup contract and, implicitly, agreed with and was not deceived
by defendant E-Systems deceptive and

illegal acts in charging

Northrup for tools which defendant E-Systems was supposed to make
but never did.
defendants'
illegally

Penney was fired, in part, because he protested to

management

billing

that

for and

defendants

receiving

were

payments

improperly

and

for tooling

and

because Penney refused David A. Williams' demand to doctor vendor
purchase orders to allow [defendant E-Systems] to receive payment
for nonexistent work.14
Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion15 that no

7.

triable issue of fact existed in connection with the Hazletine
Contract.

Defendants are attempting to perpetrate a fraud on this

Court of Appeals and on the district court by asserting that "There
was no change in the scope of the work to be performed under the

13

See

Brief of Appellee, p. 38, f 1.

14

See Verified Complaint, R. 2-20, f 59.6.
NOTE:
Defendants' assertions at Brief of Appellees p. 38 that Northrup
"in approx March 1987" audited costs, "in July 1988, E-Systems
properly
invoiced Northrup
. ..", and
"Northrups' Property
Administrator have audited and signed off on E-Systems' tooling
list every year since 1986" is TOTALLY MEANINGLESS AND IRRELEVANT
because if it happened at all (it is not verified by any Northrup
employee), it happened after Penney was fired.
15

See Brief of Appellees, p. 39, Caption #3.
-7-

[Hazeltine] contract.

There was no changes in the scope of the

work to be performed under the contract" and that

,f

[Penney]'s

allegations also do not make sense in the light of the fact that
the

Hazeltine

contract

was

a

firm

fixed

price

contract."16

Contrast these fraudulent assertions with defendant E-Systems' own
allegations made in its own Complaint in E-SYSTEMS, INC./MONTEK
DIVISION v. HAZELTINE CORPORATION. Civil No. C-89-0904469 CV, filed
JULY 20, 1989, in the THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A"
hereto)

in which

E-Systems

sued Hazeltine

contract about which Penney complained.
for

"not

less than

over the VERY

SAME

E-Systems sued Hazeltine

$20,000,000", alleging

that Hazeltine

had

"refused to reimburse E-Systems for the added costs and expenses
reasonably incurred by it in order to perform these changes."

See

Exhibit "A", p. 18, f 46, and p. 8, f 17.
8.

Penney disagrees with defendants'' assertion17 they have a

right to rely on the improperly taken and never-timely published
Deposition of Penney for purposes of this appeal.

See PLAINTIFF'S

OBJECTION TO DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER AND STATEMENT ALLOWING FILING
OR USE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION BY DEFENDANTS, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit "B" hereto, which was served on the district
court and this Court of Appeals on August L9, 1993, and which sets
forth

the

improper

circumstances

evidencing

that

Penney's

deposition was improperly taken in breach of an express written
16

See Brief of Appellees, p. 40 & 41.

17

See Brief of Appellees, p. 26, 43.
-8-

agreement by defendants' counsel and was never filed and published
with the district court until after judgment was already entered in
the above case, meaning that the district court judge NEVER had
access to a copy of Penney7s deposition until after judgment was
entered.
9.

Penney

disagrees

with

defendants'

assertion18

that

Penney's allegation that he had no had adequate opportunity to
complete discovery is untrue.
without

any

representation

Defendants admit19 that Penney was

from March

22, 1992

Penney's last attorney David K. Isom withdrew.

forward,

when

The Affidavit of

Allen J. Meril, M.D. (R.564-572), a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit "C" hereto, incontrovertibly proves that Penney underwent
major

surgery

on

March

10,

1992,

just

withdrew, and again on August 19, 1992.

before

attorney

Isom

Hence, Penney was without

counsel and recovering from the debilitating effects of two major
surgeries when the district court held its June 19, 1992 hearing on
defendants' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, when the district
court held its August 3, 1992 Scheduling Conference, and when the
defendants made and the district court ruled upon the MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
10.

Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion20 that errors

in the Court's August 3, 1992 scheduling order were harmless error.

18

See Brief of Appellees, p. 44, f 4.

19

See Brief of Appellees, p. 3 f 1) .

20

See Brief of Appellees, p. 6, n. 1.
-9-

11.

Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion21 that Penney

maintains a local address and spends "a significant amount of time
in the Salt Lake City area."

Defendants offer no evidence to

support this assertion and there is none.

Penney has a brother who

lives in Sandy, Utah, who has previously received some mail for
Penney.

However, Penney resides in Texas and, since 1986, has only

come to Utah when required to do so by the district court in the
above case.
12.

Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion22 that Penney

has never claimed to have been incapacitated "at all times since
the date he commended
scheduling conference."

this

lawsuit

or since the date of

the

See Disputed Facts number 9.

SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff Penney rejects defendants7 assertion that there are
no genuine issues of material fact disputed by the parties in this
case.

In reply to defendants' brief, Penney presents the following

arguments:
1.

The material fact of whether or not Penny was terminated

is not only in dispute, Penney has produced case law and other
factual evidence necessary to proffer a prima facie case on this
issue.

Therefore, the trial court erred in deciding the issue of

termination as a matter of law.
2.

Penney believes that contrary to public policy he was

fired because: (a) he refused to commit or condone wrongful acts,
21

See Brief of Appellees, p. 45, \ 2.

22

See Brief of Appellees, p. 46, top.
-10-

(b) he attempted to exercise his legal right to take sick leave,
and (c) defendants feared he might disclose certain of defendants'
illegal activities.
3.

Plaintiff Penney asserts that defendants erroneously rely

on three summary judgment cases that are factually distinguishable
from the

instant case.

Penney

cites case

law and

statute

supporting his belief that defendants did not meet their initial
burden of proving there are no issues of material fact to be
determined in the instant case.
4.

Penney cites case law supporting his assertion that the

instant case is not governed by the ERISA statute. Penney proffers
legal argument demonstrating that the ERISA statute has no material
bearing on the outcome or the damages in the instant case.
Therefore, it would be inappropriate for the court to say that the
case before it somehow relates to ERISA.
5.

Penney asserts that defendants intentionally engaged in

an on-going, complex pattern of conduct that, considered all
together, rises to the threshold level required to allege a prima
facie showing of outrageous conduct. There is a genuine issue here
for trial where reasonable people could find that plaintiff's
allegations (if taken as true) support his claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
6.

Penney provides factual evidence supporting his assertion

that his case was unfairly damaged by:
(a) defendants' lack of cooperation with his discovery efforts, (b)
the district court's disregard of his severe medical problems, and
-11-

(c) defendants obtaining unfair advantage through being the only
party to complete discovery. Plaintiff further asserts that the
district court's cutting off the discovery process in spite of
Plaintiffs extenuating circumstances was premature and unfairly
prejudiced his case.

REPLY ARGUMENTS
I.

The district court erred when it resolved the factual
dispute of whether or not plaintiff was constructively
terminated in violation of public policy.
Defendants continue to erroneously aver that it is undisputed

fact that Penney resigned from his employment.

From the outset of

this litigation Penney has asserted that defendants either actively
and constructively terminated his employment with them.

In fact,

there has never been agreement on this issue, nor has there been
agreement on the facts and interpretation of the facts surrounding
Penney's termination.
Defendants recite their own version of the facts as support
for their faulty contention that Penney indisputably resigned.
However, by disputing Penney's version of the facts, defendants,
themselves, have created a triable issue of fact23.
In Jenks v. Mountain States T&T Co., 53 FEP Cases 1709, 1714
n.5 (1989), the court addressed a similar dispute over whether the

23

Defendant Williams admits Penney did NOT resign but that
Williams discussed firing Penney with his immediate supervisor Mr.
Cocke before Penney ever raised the issue of resignation.
Defendant Williams determined the date to fire Penney, instructed
Mr. Cocke to specify the date in writing and inform Penney that he
was terminated effective immediately. See Affidavit of Williams.
-12-

plaintiff had resigned or whether she had been fired.

The Jenks

court reached the following conclusion:
Jenks has alleged and testified that she was terminated.
Consequently, at this juncture the court does not need to
determine whether plaintiff has made a showing of constructive
discharge. Mountain Bell,s evidence that Jenks quit only
creates a factual dispute. It does not increase plaintiff7s
prima facie burden.
Like the plaintiff in Jenks, Penney has presented evidence
that

his

employment

terminated.24

with

defendants

had

been

involuntarily

And, similar to defendant Mountain Bell in Jenks,

defendants in the instant case have insisted that Penney resigned.
This disagreement creates a factual dispute.

However, as the

court found in Jenks, it neither increases plaintiff's prima facie
burden nor demands the court's attention as to whether there has
been a showing of constructive discharge.
In reply to defendants' argument claiming that plaintiff did
not identify the basis for any substantial and important public
policy

implicated

by

his

alleged

termination,

please

see

plaintiff's arguments previously presented in Brief of Plaintiff
pages 17-24.
Penney believes that there are substantial and important
public policy concerns that were violated when E-Systems fired him.
In his brief, plaintiff argues that it is contrary to public policy
24

Penney has established a prima facie case by affidavit
supporting his claim that he was fired or constructively
terminated.
For example, in Penney's First Affidavit par. 11,
Penney testified that defendants had threatened to fire him on
numerous occasions and that they had tried to coerce and intimidate
him into resigning. However, Penney also testified that he would
not resign because he could not afford to lose his insurance.
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for E-Systems to fire Penney because: (1) he refused to commit or
condone wrongful acts, (2) Penney attempted to exercise his legal
right to take sick leave, and (3) Penney might disclose certain of
defendants' illegal activities.25
II.

The district court erred when it (1) ruled that
defendants had proven the absence of a genuine issue
concerning any material fact, and (2) failed to construe
that complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff
or indulge all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's
favor.

In defendants' brief, (p. 6, N. 1) defendants admit that in
its scheduling order the district court erroneously entered the
cut-off date for dispositive motions as January 4, 1992.

However,

plaintiff - as a PRO SE litigant - relied to his detriment, on the
court's written scheduling order.
Consequently, Penney was completely surprised and unprepared
for defendants' summary judgment motion, relying on the court's
erroneous document stating that the time for all such motions had
long passed.
The court, therefore, unfairly accepted defendants' motion
after causing Penney to rely on an erroneous scheduling order.
Defendants erroneously argue that the appellate court cannot
consider Penney's case because the issues were not clearly defined
prior to summary judgment.
25

See Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment for specific, factual details regarding
some of
defendants' illegal and wrongful acts and their material bearing on
Penney's termination.(R. 655-680, Also included in Addendum to
Brief of Plaintiff Exhibit "C")
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Defendants rely on three cases in support of their argument:
(1) Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management. 645 P.2d 667, 671
(Utah 1982); (2) State v. Castner.825 P.2d 699, 705 n.4 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); and (3) Lebaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises. 823 P.2d
479, 482-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

In order to bolster their

argument, defendants have purposely misquoted the courts in both
Turtle and Castner, substituting the words "District Court" for the
courts' words "trial court" in both instances.
Perhaps defendants intend to draw the court's attention away
from the fact that all three cases mentioned above were very
different from the instant case of Mr. Penney.

The plaintiffs in

all three of the above cases were allowed complete trials with
their appeals being raised

only after the verdict had been

rendered.
Unlike the appellants in Turtle. Castner. and Lebaron. Penney
has never had the opportunity to raise any issues at trial.
Indeed, this entire appeal is to determine whether Penney, who has
recovered from his injury and regained sufficient physical and
emotional

strength

effectively

to participate

fully

in this

litigation, will be given his day in court. Turtle. Castner. and
Lebaron stand only for the proposition that an issue must be raised
at trial in order to preserve its claim on appeal.

Therefore,

these cases do not apply to Penney's situation in the instant case.
A more appropriate standard in the instant case would be that
set forth in Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co. . 823 P. 2d 1055,
1058

(Utah 1991) where the court recognized the necessity to
-15-

construe the complaint

in "the light most

favorable to the

plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor."

In

doing so, the court inferred from the pleadings an issue of
defamation that had not been specifically defined in the complaint
itself.
In the federal system, the standard for summary judgement is
set by Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 which stands for
the principle that summary judgement is only applicable where the
moving party can fully "meet its initial burden of establishing the
absence" of a genuine issue.

Even if the motion for summary

judgment goes unopposed, Adickes further states that the inferences
to be drawn from all the underlying facts contained in the moving
party's materials must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.
The materials to be considered in a summary judgment motion
are outlined in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which reads in pertinent part:
[A summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
Defendants have failed to meet their initial burden of proving
that there are no genuine issues of fact in the instant case.

III. The district court erred in ruling that the ERISA
statute
bars
the
instant
case
from
its
jurisdiction.
Defendants rely on the following three cases in support of
-16-

their contention that Penney's claim is barred by ERISA: (1) Shaw
v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); (2) Pilot Life Ins, Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987); and (3)Inqersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
However, all three cases are easily distinguishable from the
instant case.

In the above-mentioned ERISA cases, the plaintiffs7

causes of action were integrally based on whether or not an ERISA
claim existed, and they required the courts' analyses of the ERISA
claim.

The Ingersoll-Rand court held: "Because the existence of a

plan is a critical factor in establishing liability, and the trial
court 7 s inquiry must be directed to the plan, this judicially
created cause of action 'relate[s] to' an ERISA plan." InqersollRand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,133 (1990).
Unlike the Inqersoll-Rand and Shaw plaintiffs, Penney does not
claim that defendants7 motive for dismissing him was to deprive
them of ERISA benefits.

The court in the instant case is not

required to determine any legal issues relating to ERISA.
In the instant case, Penney is only claiming that loss of
insurance due to defendants7 negligent or willful departure from
company

policy26 resulted

in damages

easily

calculated

by

the

existence of Penney 7 s medical bills which he had to pay without
26

In Appellees7 Brief, defendants admit that they had a duty
to provide plaintiff with the insurance conversion form.
They
further admit that the procedure was one expressly provided by ESystems7 own Health Care and Weekly Income Disability Plan.
(Defendants7 Brief, page 19 paragraph 9 and footnote 12.)
By violating their own express policy, defendants have
severely injured plaintiff. They should not now be allowed to hide
behind an ERISA statute to shield them from the rightful
consequences of their wrongful actions.
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benefit of insurance.
Whether or not the plaintiff was covered by the ERISA statute
has no material bearing on the outcome or the damages in the
instant case.

Therefore, it would be inappropriate for the court

to say that the case before it somehow relates to ERISA.
IV.

The district court should have found that defendants'
pattern of conduct rises to a level which reasonable
minds could conclude was sufficiently outrageous to
support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

In order for plaintiff to defeat a summary judgment motion on
this issue, he need only allege conduct sufficient to support a
claim for emotional distress.

The court in Jenks v. Mountain

States T & T Co., 53 FEP Cases 1709, 1713 referred to the decision
rendered in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986) when it stated, " At the summary judgment stage, the court's
function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."
Defendants seem to think that plaintiff has no right to a jury
trial on the issue unless he first "proves" his case to the trial
judge.

(See

Brief

of

Defendants

p.

21.)

Defendants

have

apparently forgotten that the purpose of a trial is to "prove" to
the trier of fact the merits of the claims asserted.
Certainly,

Plaintiff

Penney

has

alleged

conduct

that

reasonable people could determine is outrageous.27
Defendants cite a case where a supervisor's racial slurs,
27

See Plaintiff's Brief pages 24-31 for arguments describing
defendants' pattern of conduct designed to cause plaintiff severe
emotional and physical distress.
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jokes

and

other

rude

and

non-sympathetic

plaintiff were not found to be outrageous.

behavior

toward

the

In the instant case,

however, Penney has alleged an on-going, complex pattern of conduct
that,

considered

all

together,

rises

to

the

threshold

level

required to allege a prima facie case of outrageous conduct.
Defendants

also

cite Jenks

(supra)

as an example

of a

plaintiff who did not allege sufficient damage that might sustain
a claim for emotional distress. Plaintiff Penney is very different
from the plaintiff in Jenks.

The plaintiff in Jenks stated that

she felt turmoil and a "sort of depression" over losing her job.
Penney, on the other hand, has alleged much more emotional
distress than did the plaintiff in Jenks who claimed only a "sort
of depression" over being fired.

In the instant case, Penney has

claimed that defendant Williams exercised his authority to carry
out a campaign of intimidation and coercion against plaintiff with
the intent to create an intolerable work place situation.
Plaintiff alleges the following conduct that taken as a whole
created an intolerable working environment:28
(1) That because of his health problems, he was subjected to
ridicule and ostracization by defendant Williams;
(2) That

he

was

denied

access

to

projects, relieved

of

resources and authority, while given an increased work load;
(3) That he was forced to work hundreds of hours of overtime,
28

The following claims are supported by facts alleged in
Plaintiff's Complaint and in Plaintiff's First Affidavit. For a
more complete statement of the facts surrounding Penney's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, see also Brief of
Plaintiff, pages 6-11.
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even during illness;
(4) That he was under constant threat of firing; and
(5) That he was refused his lawfully accrued vacation time and
sick leave, and even denied the right to use vacation time for
doctor appointments after he was injured in an automobile accident.
Reasonable people could find, under such circumstances, that
Penney

did

indeed

suffer

severe

treatment by defendant E-Systems.

emotional

distress

from

his

The court is obligated to look

at the allegations in a light most favorable to plaintiff before
deciding whether plaintiff has pled a prima facie case on this
issue.
Defendants erroneously claim that Penney's emotional distress
claim is barred by Utah Workers' Compensation Act.

In Mounteer v.

Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991) the court held
that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act bars claims based on a coworker's injurious acts unless they were intended or directed by
the employer.
In the instant case, Penney makes no claim against a coworker . His claims are solely based on and confined to the actions
of

Defendant

E-Systems

and

its

agents,

those

in

management

positions with authority over Plaintiff Penney.
Therefore, the Workers' Compensation argument presented by
defendants is not applicable in this case.

-20-

V.

The district court should have considered Penney's
extraordinary circumstances, and the court erred when it
prejudiced Penney's case by prematurely cutting off
discovery.

It is not unheard of for discovery in complicated civil cases
to take several years to complete even where all litigants are in
best of health and reside in close proximity to the trial court.
In their motion for an extension of time to respond to
plaintiff's appellate brief, defendants, themselves, noted the
complex nature of the case and the arguments involved.

Although

the defendants are represented by a large legal firm that can draw
on multiple staff and resources, they pled extenuating personal
circumstances and case complexity as a reason for requiring the
extension of time.
Defendants apparently expect a double standard when it comes
to the court's granting extensions of time.

Although

defendants

have begged the court's indulgence due to their own circumstances,
they have shown a total disregard for Penney's misfortunes, part of
which are of defendants' making.29
The following list of Penney's extenuating circumstances will
demonstrate clearly why the district court should have granted
Penney additional time for discovery:
1.

During the two years of discovery Penney underwent five
major surgeries. (Dr. Meril Affidavit R. 603)

2.

Each surgery naturally required extensive recuperation.
The court showed little or no consideration for Penney's
surgery schedules or recuperation when it arranged its
own docket. (Dr. Meril Affidavit R. 603)

29

See R. 70-71.
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3.

Because defendants7 actions rendered Penney uninsured and
uninsurable, Penney was forced to spend all his personal
assets on medical treatment.

4.

Penney was unable to continuously employ and effectively
work with legal counsel during most of this discovery
period because of his impecuniosity caused by his
extensive medical treatment, and because of his resultant
physical and mental incapacitation making it difficult to
deal with the numerous complex facts and issues of
discovery.

5.

Penney had the additional burden of trying to pursue this
discovery, pro se, while living out of the State of Utah.

6.

Penney7s attempts to
complete discovery were frustrated
by: (1) defendants7 lack of cooperation in scheduling
their depositions, and (2) their evasive or incomplete
responses to plaintiff's interrogatories and request for
production of documents.

7.

Defendants themselves admit (in their motion for
enlargement of time in which to file their Brief of
Appellees) to the complex nature of this case, and assert
that the issues herein cannot be easily dealt with.

Plaintiff Penney cooperated fully with defendants7 efforts to
take his deposition and made himself fully available for discovery,
even though he was required to travel back and forth between Utah
and his home in Texas. However, once defendants had achieved their
discovery objectives, they sought to avoid giving Penney any
document

or

deposition

necessary

to

the

completion

of

his

discovery.
Instead, they succeeded in cutting off the date for discovery,
fully aware of Penney7s impecuniosity, his inability to travel
frequently to Utah, his physical and emotional break down, his pro
se status, his inexperience with the legal system,

and their own

recalcitrance.
Considering

Penney7s

entire
-22-

list

of

extenuating

circumstances, reasonable minds could clearly conclude that the
district court abused its discretion in prematurely cutting off
discovery in the instant case.
CONCLUSIONS
It is a fundamental principle of civil procedure that the
moving party in a summary judgment motion must show "the absence of
a genuine issue concerning any material fact." Adickes v. S. H.
Kress & Co.. 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed. 2d 142.
The general formula for the administration of a summary
judgment motion has been long established and was reiterated in
Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Serv. Bur. Inc., 484 P.2d 953, 958
(1971) (Emphasis added.):
The matter to be determined by the trial court in considering
such a motion is whether the defendant (or the plaintiff) has
presented any facts which give rise to a triable issue. The
court may not pass upon the issue itself. Summary judgment is
proper only if the affidavits in support of the moving party
would be sufficient to sustain a judgment in his favor and his
opponent does not by affidavit show such facts as may be
deemed . . . sufficient to present a triable issue. . . .
[T]he affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed
and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as
to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in
favor of the party opposing the motion. Such summary procedure
is drastic and should be used with caution so that it does not
become a substitute for the open trial method of determining
the facts.
The nature of the evidence presented by defendants in support
of their motion for summary judgment is in the form of affidavits
which simply deny some of the allegations and facts introduced by
plaintiff in the prosecution of his claim. These affidavits prove
nothing more than the existence of a factual dispute between the
parties.

They carry no more weight than the affidavits of the
-23-

plaintiff; in fact, being strictly construed for the purposes of
the motion, they carry very much less weight than the affidavits of
the plaintiff.
Although plaintiff also has submitted opposing affidavits and
other evidence to support his claim,30 defendants wish the court to
consider only their affidavits as evidence in the case. It appears
that defendants are hoping to reverse the rules by expecting the
court to strictly construe plaintiff's affidavits while giving them
every liberal interpretation that might be given to documents
accepted at face value.
Apparently, defendants wish to try all issues of this case by
affidavit as a substitute for the open trial method of determining
the facts. They have thus far succeeded in denying plaintiff his
full discovery and hope to succeed in altogether denying him his
day in court.
Plaintiff prays that this court will weigh the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits and other documents produced in discovery
in the light most favorable to his case. Plaintiff prays that this
court will re-open the discovery process so that he may take the
deposition of defendants and witnesses essential to the proving of
his claims. Plaintiff prays that this court will also consider the
extraordinary extenuating circumstances caused by the combination
of his severe health problems, his impecuniosity, his out-of-state
30

See Plaintiff's Response (with its accompanying exhibits)
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's Affidavits,
and the Affidavit of Dr. Alan J. Meril, a Long with the Docketing
Statement and other documents included in the record and the
addenda.
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residency, and his pro se status in deciding whether he has been
given full access to, and benefit of, the consideration of the
district court in the prosecution of his claims.
And finally, Plaintiff prays that after due consideration this
court will overturn the trial court's harsh summary judgment
verdict, that has summarily disposed of his claims without the
benefit of completing discovery or of presenting his issues of fact
before a jury.
//

//

"

, * *

RESPECTFULLY submitted this /t)

day of September, 1993

ney^f
William V. Penney
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Plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division, by counsel,
files this Complaint against defendant Hazeltine Corporation, and
for its Complaint states and alleges as follows:
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JURISDICTION
1.

Jurisdiction of this Court is based upon Utah Code

Ann, § 78-3-4/ and upon the Utah long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-24.
VENUE
2.

Venue in this Court is based upon Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-13-4/ in that the plaintiff is doing business in this
judicial district and the events and actions giving rise to this
cause of action occurred or were taken or the effects were felt in
this judicial district.
PARTIES
3.

Plaintiff E-Systems, Inc., Montek Division

("E-Systems"), is a division of E-Systems, Inc., a Delaware
corporation having its principal place of business in Dallas,
Texas.

The Montek Division, which designs, develops and

manufactures advanced electronic navigational equipment and
avionics, maintains its principal office at 2268 South 3270 West,
Salt Lake City, Utah
4.

84119.

Upon information and belief, defendant Hazeltine

Corporation ("Hazeltine") is a Delaware corporation having its
principal place of business on Cuba Hill Road, Greenlawn, New York.
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
5.

In early 1982, E-Systems began research and

development work on a ground-based transponder system known as
-2-
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"DME/P," an acronym standing for "Precision Distance Measuring
Equipment."

The DME/P is crucial to, and E-Systems* efforts were

made in anticipation of, the Federal Aviation Administration's
("FAA") Microwave Landing System program ("MLS"), a "next
generation" navigation and guidance system designed to increase
the number of instrument approaches and landings that could be
made at various airports across the nation.

The DME/P system,

function of which the ground-based DME/P transponder is a crucial
part, provides very precise, continuous information regarding
distance (range) between the airport and an aircraft executing an
MLS instrument approach, and displays that distance in the cockpit
for use by the crew during the approach.
6.

On December 7, 1982, and in anticipation of the

solicitation of bids for the MLS program, E-Systems and Hazeltine
entered into a Teaming Agreement, one of the purposes of which was
to facilitate an integrated approach by the parties to compete
for, and meet the demands of, the anticipated FAA contract award
for the MLS program.

A copy of the December 1982 Teaming

Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein
by reference.
7.

Pursuant to the terms of the 1982 Teaming Agreement,

Hazeltine was to serve as the prime contractor on any contract
awarded by the FAA.

E-Systems, in turn, was to act as the

subcontractor for the design, testing and production of the
-3-
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DME/P.

The 1982 Teaming Agreement further imposed certain

pre-award and post-award obligations on both parties, including
significant obligations on E-Systems' part to provide technical
expertise and assistance in the preparation of Hazeltine's
proposal for the MLS contract.
8.

Based upon performance specifications released by the

FAA in advance of its formal Request for Proposals and upon
Hazeltine's instructions as to what would be necessary to meet the
FAA specifications, E-Systems continued work at its own expense on
the development and testing of the DME/P through the spring of
1983.
9.

It was Hazeltine's and E-Systems* intent to develop a

full system design prior to submission of a proposal to the FAA so
that the Hazeltine proposal could include actual, measured data
demonstrating that the E-Systems' design for the DME/P fully
complied with the FAA specifications.

The parties believed that

this strategy would serve several objectives.

First, it would

provide a high degree of confidence that the specification
requirements could be met by the proposed design.

Also, it would

both permit the submission of the offer to perform under a
fixed-price contract requested by the FAA and demonstrate an
ability to meet the FAA's 18-month schedule.

Because the

E-Systems1 DME/P design had very nearly been completed and tested
prior to the award of the FAA contract, and with the understanding

"4"

OOQQOS

that this proven design was to be utilized in the event of the
award of the FAA contract to Hazeltine, E-Systems agreed to absorb
the non-recurring costs
design.

for research and development of its DME/P

At the time of the FAA contract award, E-Systems had

already expended approximately 95 percent of the anticipated
development costs for its design, using its own funds.
10.

On April 18, 1983, the FAA published its formal

Request for Proposal No. DTFA-01-83-R-27174 for the MLS program
(the "RFP").

Subsequently, in June 1983, Hazeltine submitted its

proposal in response to the RFP, which included, among other
things, actual test data for the E-Systems' DME/P.

As

anticipated, this data demonstrated that all of the major
performance specifications called for by the FAA's RFP could be
met by the originally developed E-Systems' design.
11.

During the latter part of 1983, Hazeltine and the

FAA performed their evaluation of the E-Systems technical and cost
proposals.

As part of that review process, E-Systems met with

Hazeltine and the FAA to provide clarification and answers to
questions regarding E-Systems* proposed design for the DME/P
system.

As evidenced by the ultimate award of the prime contract

to Hazeltine and the subsequent award of the subcontract to
E-Systems, the originally proposed DME/P was determined by
Hazeltine and the FAA to be adequate for contract performance.

-5-
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12.

On January 12, 1984, Hazeltine was awarded FAA

Contract DTFA01-84-C00008 for the Microwave Landing System.
Shortly thereafter, on January 31, 1984, Hazeltine issued to
E-Systems its telex authorization to proceed with work.

In

accordance with the telex authorization and the 1982 Teaming
Agreement, E-Systems accepted Hazeltine1s telex offer and
commenced work as a subcontractor to Hazeltine at that time.
13.

On December 21, 1985, to "definitize" the telex

authorization, Hazeltine and E-Systems agreed upon additional
terms of the subcontract ("Subcontract K25213") for the
development, production and delivery of 178 DME/P systems plus
options for a total firm fixed price of $13,064,549.73.
Modifications to the subcontract not relevant hereto subsequently
reduced the fixed-price to $11,539,925.94.

At the same time, the

parties entered into a second Teaming Agreement, which superseded
their prior agreement of December 7, 1982.

Copies of the

December 21, 1985 Teaming Agreement and Subcontract K25213 are
attached hereto as Exhibits 2 and 3, respectively, and are
incorporated herein by reference.
14.

To date, Hazeltine has made progress payments to

E-Systems under the subcontract of approximately $7,000,000.
15.

By the time E-Systems received authorization to

proceed under the subcontract, and as a direct result of E-Systems'
company-funded program of development, an engineering model of
-6-
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E-Systems* DME/P was 95 percent complete.

It was understood and

agreed upon by the parties that the subcontract would not contain
any additional research and development costs because the DME/P
proposed by E-Systems was based upon an existing, nearly finalized
design, the cost of which had already been borne by E-Systems, and
which previously had been shown to be capable of meeting all major
performance specifications contained in the FAA*s original RFP.
16.

In negotiating the terms of the Teaming Agreement

and subcontract, the parties relied upon the following understandings, each of which was material to E-Systems1 decision to enter
into an agreement with Hazeltine:
a)

the DME/P design which was proposed and priced

by E-Systems during the proposal phase would be used for purposes
of subcontract performance;
b)

because research and development of that DME/P

design was essentially complete prior to contract and subcontract
award, no additional development costs would have to be passed on
to Hazeltine or, in turn, to the FAA;
c)

the E-Systems* design would meet all major DME/P

specification requirements contained in the original FAA Request
for Proposal; and,
d)

in order to comply with the FAA's 18-month

program schedule, use of the existing DME/P design was not only
preferable, but was, in fact, required.
-7-
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17.

After the issuance of the telex authorization to

E-Systems, Hazeltine imposed a series of design and specification
changes and new interpretations of existing specifications, which
together constituted a drastic revision of the basic understandings
on which the telex authorization, the definitized subcontract, and
the Teaming Agreements were based.

These changes and

interpretations had not been made known to E-Systems at the time
of the proposal preparation or subcontract award and, in virtually
each instance, were contrary to the express understandings of both
Hazeltine and E-Systems at the time the telex authorization was
accepted and the subcontract entered into.

Hazeltine subsequently

refused to recognize these modifications under the "Changes"
clause of the definitized subcontract and, therefore, refused to
reimburse E-Systems for the added costs and expenses reasonably
incurred by it in order to perform these changes.
18.

The modifications had the effect of altering the

Subcontract from a contract for the production of equipment using
an existing design (properly designated a "fixed-price" contract)
to a contract under which Hazeltine claimed that E-Systems was
responsible for developing an entirely new system that would meet
its revised and considerably more demanding requirements (properly
designated a "cost reimbursement" contract).

However, a cost

reimbursement contract was not provided to E-Systems, and yet

-8-
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E-Systems was required by Hazeltine to perform the new development
under the original fixed-price contract.
19.

Because of the modifications imposed upon it by

Hazeltine, E-Systems was forced to abandon the design upon which
its subcontract with Hazeltine was based and virtually to "start
from scratch."

Indeed, in actual flight testing by the FAA, the

new design forced upon E-Systems provided test results ten times
more precise than those required by the original specifications.
20.

As a further consequence of these modifications,

E-Systems was required to perform substantial additional work and
to incur additional costs over and above those contained in
Subcontract K25213.

These costs included both recurring costs

(e.g.; material and production) and non-recurring costs (e.g.,
research and development) not envisioned by the parties.
21.

Pursuant to the terms of the subcontract, E-Systems

submitted separate glaims totalling more than $10,000,000 for
equitable adjustments for non-recurring and recurring costs on
November 30, 1988 and May 12, 1989, respectively.

In derogation

of its contractual obligations under the subcontract, Hazeltine
has:

1) refused to submit E-Systems1 certified claims for non-

recurring costs in a timely manner or to pursue those claims in
good faith; 2) unreasonably delayed the processing of E-Systems*
certified claim for recurring costs and has otherwise failed to
pursue that claim in good faith; and 3) by its actions under the
-9-
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prime contract with the FAA, has further prejudiced both
E-Systems* certified claims for non-recurring and recurring costs.
22.

Upon information and belief, and in further

derogation of E-Systems* rights and Hazeltine's duties under
Subcontract K25213, Hazeltine informed the FAA in August 1988 that
it intended to phase down its efforts under the prime contract in
order to enter into a study period as a result of which virtually
all work on the contract and related Subcontract K25213 came to a
halt.

Upon further information and belief, Hazeltine and the FAA

subsequently enteied into a Memorandum of Understanding to permit
resolution of the various contractual issues between them.
23.

E-Systems was not informed of such agreement or

Memorandum of Understanding prior to its execution, nor was it
permitted to participate in key meetings prior thereto, despite
the fact that such meetings and agreement plainly affected terms,
conditions and ultimate performance of the E-Systems' subcontract
with Hazeltine.

Hazeltine's failure to keep E-Systems informed as

to these and other matters pertinent to E-Systems* performance
violates and is in breach of the terms of the Teaming Agreement,
which expressly provides that "Hazeltine will at all times during
the period of this Teaming Agreement keep [E-Systems] fully
advised of the status of each proposal, contract, subcontract or
modification to the prime contract which affects [E-Systems] and
inquiries and comments with respect thereto.
-10-
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afford [E-SystemsJ the opportunity to be present at all key
presentations, discussions, conferences or program reviews,
whether pursuant to a solicitation or under awarded contract(s),
where the product of E-Systems is under discussion.

..."

Exhibit 2 at page 3.
24.

Throughout the performance period of the

subcontract, Hazeltine has repeatedly breached the terms of its
agreement with E-Systems by failing to provide necessary support
services requested by E-Systems as provided for under the terms of
the subcontract.

By way of example, and without intended

limitation, Hazeltine failed to resolve several issues regarding
the number and unit price of equipment called for under the
subcontract, claiming that the issue was pending final resolution
of Hazeltine's own disputes with the FAA under its prime
contract.

Similarly, Hazeltine has refused to witness various

testing procedures or to pursue FAA approval of so-called First
Article Testing ("FAT").

As a result, and despite repeated

requests by E-Systems for this and other similar support,
Hazeltine's breach of contract has rendered E-Systems unable to
perform necessary testing of its new DME/P, and has left it in a
position in which it is clearly untenable, if not impossible, for
E-Systems to proceed with the production and delivery of the
system.
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25.

Hazeltine's conduct has placed E-Systems in a

"stop-work" position under the terms of its subcontract; by virtue
of the fact that Hazeltine has called an effective halt to the
program by not permitting E-Systems to proceed with the testing
and production of the DME/P system despite E-Systems having been
ready, willing and able to do so.

By letters dated July 13, 1988;

July 21, 1988, July 27, 1988, August 3, 1988, August 26, 1988,
September 19, 1988 and September 26, 1988, E-Systems documented
the delay and disruption occasioned by Hazeltine's conduct, and
ultimately informed Hazeltine that, as a result, E-Systems had
been placed in a stop-work position for purposes of future
performance under the subcontract.

Copies of these letters are

attached hereto as Exhibits 4 through 10, respectively, and are
incorporated herein by reference.
26.

Hazeltine initially took the position that, despite

its phase-down, E-Systems could nevertheless complete various
discrete tasks under the subcontract.

Hazeltine was, however,

unable to identify any such tasks during a meeting convened for
that purpose in January 1989.
27.

As a consequence of Hazeltine's constructive

stop-work order, E-Systems has been required to expend substantial
resources in order to assure that it would remain ready to perform
its obligations under the subcontract should Hazeltine lift the
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stop-work and request E-Systems to complete performance.

To date,

no such request has been received by E-Systems.
28.

Pursuant to Article XXXVII of Subcontract K25213,

Hazeltine must, within 90 days of the date that it imposes a
stop-work condition upon E-Systems, either cancel the stop-work
condition (that is, permit E-Systems to complete performance) or
terminate the subcontract for convenience pursuant to the
"Termination for Convenience" clause of Article XXXVII of the
subcontract.

See Exhibit 3, Art. XXXVII at pages 111-10 and

111-30.
29.

Because Hazeltine has permitted the stop-work

condition to persist for more than 90 days without permitting
E-Systems to return to work, the subcontract has, by its terms,
constructively been terminated by convenience, entitling E-Systems
to an award of the various costs, together with a reasonable
margin of profit, as more fully set forth under Article XXXVII of
the subcontract.
30.

At all times relevant hereto, E-Systems has remained

fully ready, willing and able to perform the services and
obligations required of it under the terms of its agreement with
Hazeltine.
COUNT ONE
(Breach of Contract —
31.

Subcontract K25213)

E-Systems incorporates by reference the allegations
-13-
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set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 30 as though fully set forth
herein.
32.

The unilateral acts and omissions of Hazeltine were

in derogation of E-Systems* rights under, and in breach of the
terms of, Subcontract K25213.
33.

As a result of Hazeltine's breach, E-Systems has

been unable to perform its obligations under the subcontract.
34.

E-Systems has remained ready, willing and able to

perform each and every obligation required of it under the
parties' original agreement.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division
demands judgment against defendant Hazeltine Corporation as
follows:
a)

a declaration that Hazeltine Corporation's

conduct constitutes a constructive Notice to Stop Work under
Article XXXVII of Subcontract K25213;
b)

a declaration that, by virtue of Hazeltine's

inaction, Subcontract K25213 has been terminated for convenience
pursuant to Article XXXVII of the subcontract;
c)

an award to E-Systems of its recurring and

non-recurring costs incurred as a result of Hazeltine Corporation's wrongful conduct, in an amount not less than $20,000,000,
together with interest and a reasonable margin of profit thereon;
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d)

an award of E-Systems' costs and reasonable

attorneys' fees, together with such other relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.
COUNT TWO
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing — Subcontract K25213)
35.

E-Systems incorporates by reference the allegations

set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 34 as though fully set forth
herein.
36.

In entering into Subcontract K25213 with E-Systems,

Hazeltine impliedly agreed to carry out in good faith the
obligations and duties imposed upon it, including, inter alia, the
provision of support services which served as the necessary basis
for E-Systems* performance under the subcontract.
37.

By failing to honor its obligations under the

subcontract and by purposefully delaying and disrupting E-Systems'
performance thereunder, Hazeltine breached its implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
38.

As a result of Hazeltine's conduct, including its

failure to take any action regarding the constructive stop-work
order imposed upon E-Systems by it, E-Systems has been damaged in
an amount not less than $20,000,000.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division
demands judgment against defendant Hazeltine Corporation as
follows:
-15-
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a)

a declaration that Hazeltina Corporation^*

conduct constitutes a constructive Notice to Stop Work undei
Article XXXVII of Subcontract K25213;
b)

a declaration that, by virtue of Hazeltine's

inaction, Subcontract K25213 has been terminated for convenience
pursuant to Article XXXVII of the subcontract;
c)

an award to E-Systems of its recurring and

non-recurring costs incurred as a result of Hazelt-me Corporation's wrongful conduct, in an amount not less than $20,000,000,
together with interest and a reasonable margin of profit thereon;
d)

an award of E-Systems' costs and reasonable

attorneys' fees, together with such other relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.
COUNT THREE
(Breach of Contract —
39.

Teaming Agreement)

E-Systems incorporates by reference the allegations

set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 38 as though fully set forth
herein.
40.

The unilateral acts and omissions of Hazeltme were

in derogation of E-Systems' rights under, and in breach of the
terms of, the December 21, 1985 Teaming Agreement.
41.

As a result of Hazeltine's breach, E-Systems has

been unable to perform its obligations under the Teaming Agreement.
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42.

E-Systems has remained ready, willing and able to

perform each and every obligation required of it under the
parties' Teaming Agreement.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division
demands judgment against defendant Hazeltine Corporation in an
amount to be determined at trial, but in no event less than
$20,000,000, representing the costs and expenses incurred by
E-Systems as a result of defendant's breach of the Teaming
Agreement, together with interest, costs and attorneys' fees, and
such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate.
COUNT FOUR
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing -- Teaming Agreement)
43.

E-Systems incorporates by reference the allegations

set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 42 as though fully set forth
herein.
44.

In entering into the December 21, 1985 Teaming

Agreement with E-Systems, Hazeltine impliedly agreed to carry out
in good faith the obligations and duties imposed upon it,
including, inter alia, its duty to keep E-Systems fully informed
as to developments affecting its performance under the subcontract,
as well as its duty to perform diligently its own obligations and
responsibilities under the prime contract with the FAA.
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45.

By failing to perform diligently its obligations

under the prime contract and by refusing to keep E-Systems fully
informed as to all pertinent developments affecting E-Systems*
performance under its subcontract with Hazeltine, Hazeltine
breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
46.

As a result of Hazeltine's breach, E-Systems has

been damaged in an amount not less than $20,000,000.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division
demands judgment against defendant Hazeltine Corporation in an
amount to be determined at trial, but in no event less than
$20,000,000, together with interest, costs and attorneys* fees,
and such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division, hereby demands
a trial by jury as to all issues of fact triable as of right by a
jury.
DATED this^jO-^day of July, 1989.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Merlin 0. Baker
Jonathan A. Dibble
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
(801)

532-1500
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A. %*JL^

fames A. Hourihan
JGAN & HARTSON
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W,
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-6544
Richard E. Dunne, III
Joseph H. Young
HOGAN & HARTSON
111 South Calvert Street
Suite 1600
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(301) 659-2700

Attorneys for Plaintiff
E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division
Plaintiff's address:
2268 South 3270 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84119

0825b
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WILLIAM V. PENNEY
Plaintiff, Appearing Pro Se
709 West Rusk Suite "A"
Rockwall, TX 75087
Telephone: 214/771-8383
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM V. PENNEY,
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO
Plaintiff,
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER
AND STATEMENT ALLOWING
vs.
FILING OR USE OF
PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION BY
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
DEFENDANTS
corporation, DAVID A.
WILLIAMS, ALFRED B. BUCHANAN,
Civil No. 900903522CV
Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendants.
Ct Of Appeals # 930368-CA
Pursuant to the order of the THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT in
the above case filed as of August 9, 1993, and pursuant to Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h), Plaintiff William V. Penney
("Penney"),

appearing

pro

se, hereby

files

his

PLAINTIFFS

OBJECTION TO DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER AND STATEMENT ALLOWING FILING
OR USE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION BY DEFENDANTS as follows:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

It was agreed by defendants' counsel in advance of their

taking Penney's deposition that they would limit each deposition
session to a morning session not to exceed two to three hours in
duration.

See attached copy of August 13, 1990 letter of Penney's

counsel Mr. L. Zane Gill to defendants' counsel which stated, among
other things:
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I appreciate your accommodation with regard to
scheduling of the depositions set for my client.
Penney's physical condition makes it very difficult
him to do anything that requires constant attention
more than two or three hours at a time.

the
Mr.
for
for

(See also copy of attached AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN J. MERil, M.D.,
from R.565)
2.

By letter dated August 10, 1990, defendants' counsel

Douglas R. Davis agreed to time limitations requested by Penney as
follows:
Regarding your request to limit the number of hour your
client must sit through his deposition scheduled for
September 10, 1990, we will certainly be willing to make
any appropriate accommodations, including continuing the
deposition until the next day, September 11, 1990, if
necessary. (See attached copy of said August 10, 1990
letter)
3.

Despite defendants' counsels' express written and oral

promises, though Penney's deposition commenced at 9:30 a.m. on the
morning of September 10, 1990, defendants' counsel breached their
promise and required Penney to continue in the deposition until
4:30 p.m. of that day, long after Penney had been forced to exceed
his physical limitations.
4.

Despite defendants' counsels' express written and oral

promises, though Penney's deposition resumed at 8:33 a.m. on the
morning of September 11, 1990, defendants' counsel breached their
promise and required Penney to continue in the deposition until
3:50 p.m., long after Penney had been forced to exceed his physical
limitations.
5. In his September 14, 1990 letter, Penney's former counsel
L. Zane Gill censored defendants' counsel for their flagrant
- 2 -

violation of their express written and oral agreement to limit
Penney's deposition to mornings and to two to three hour sessions.
(See attached 9/14/1990 letter of Gill to Parsons, Behle & Latimer)
6.

After receiving a printed copy of his deposition, Penney

found many errors, paraphrasing, omissions, and sections taken out
of context that Penney objected to.
7.

Penney's attorney of record of the time informed Penney

that there was a deadline to be met and, therefore, said attorney
used a signature that Penney had left with said counsel to affix
Penney's "signature" to the deposition.
8. Since Penney did not actually sign the deposition, it was
never corrected, dated nor notarized as required.
9.

Through

no

fault

of

Penney7s, defendants' counsel

negligently did not file the deposition, but chose to reference and
submit selected pages to the District Court in order to distort and
support their inaccurate positions.
10.

Though final Judgment was entered in the above case on

March 9, 1993 and Penney served his Notice of Appeal on April 7,
1993, the District Court's ORDER AND STATEMENT OF PROPOSED CHANGES
TO THE RECORD, which purportedly allows Penney's deposition to be
unsealed, was not filed until August 9, 1993, and allows the Penney
deposition to be filed "as of July 9, 1993", some four (4) months
after final Judgment was entered in the above case.
11. In his oral argument before the District Court on July 9,
1993, defendants' counsel David Anderson, Esq., expressly conceded
that Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h) did not allow the
- 3 -

"late" admission of the Penney deposition.
12.

It is Penney7s position that the Penney deposition was

"contaminated", that it should NOT be allowed to be filed or used
in any way, and that NO judgment should enter against Penney for
any costs associated with the contaminated Penney deposition.
DISCUSSION
By Penney's NOTICE OF APPEAL of April 6, 1993, Penney appealed
certain specified judgments, orders, acts and omissions of the
District Court that had occurred prior to the final Judgment dated
March 9, 1993.

The Penney deposition was never corrected, never

signed, never notarized and never filed with the District Court
prior to March 9, 1993. Hence, the District Court never had access
to and made or entered NO judgments or orders based on said Penney
deposition.

The effect of the District Court's ordering that the

Penney deposition may be filed "as of July 9, 1993" is to have said
deposition introduced for the first time on appeal which is wholly
inappropriate as being contrary to applicable rules of appellate
procedure, existing case law and contrary to the requirements of
just and equitable treatment of the parties in the above case.
In his oral argument before the District Court on July 9,
1993, defendants' counsel David Anderson, Esq., expressly conceded
that Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h) did not allow the
"late" admission of the Penney deposition.
Neither the District Court nor the Appellate Court should
allow the filing, publication, or consideration of the Penney
deposition where the Penney deposition was taken by defendants'
- 4 -

counsel in a manner that materially and substantially breached and
violated their express written and oral promises to Penney and his
counsel of record and where that breach and violation resulted in
substantial, material and irreparable harm to Penney.
If the District Court or Appellate Court allow, for any
reason, the filing of the Penney deposition, absolutely no or
negligible credence, credibility, or other consideration should be
given to the Penney deposition by the Appellate Court in the
context of Penney7s appeal because said Penney deposition was
"contaminated" by defendants7 counsels' taking and conducting the
Penney deposition in a manner that materially and substantially
breached and violated their express written and oral promises to
Penney and his counsel of record and that breach and violation
resulted in substantial, material and irreparable harm to Penney.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFOR, based on the facts and law previously cited herein,
the District Court and Appellate Court should NOT allow the filing
of the Penney deposition; and, if the filing of the Penney
deposition is allowed for any reason, absolutely no or negligible
credence, credibility, or other consideration should be given to
the Penney deposition by the Appellate Court in the context of
Penney7s appeal because said Penney deposition was "contaminated"
by

defendants7

counsels7

taking

and

conducting

the

Penney

deposition in a manner that materially and substantially breached
and violated their express written and oral promises to Penney and
his counsel of record and that breach and violation resulted in
- 5 -

substantial, material and irreparable harm to Penney.
Respectfully submitted this

19

day of August, 1993.

/s/ William V. Penney
William v. Penney, Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the
19
day of
August, 1993, a true, accurate and complete copy of the foregoing
was served upon the defendants by the undersigned's mailing same
first class mail postage prepaid as follows:
DAVID A. ANDERSON, Esq.
PAUL E. DAME, Esq.
Parsons Behle & Latimer
201 South Main St., Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
230 South 500 East
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah
/s/ Eleonore Fox
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WILLIAM V. PENNEY
Pro 8a
233a Seat Cliff Swallow Driva
Sandy, Utah 14093
Telephone* 801/944-0993

QOC or AOS-»PENNEY & ASSOCIATES

214-771-3416
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 07 SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM V. PENNEY!
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ALLEN J. MERIL, M.D.

vs«
E-SYSTEMfl, INC., a Dalawara
corporation, DAVID A.
WILLIAMS, ALFRED B. BUCHANAN,

Civil No. 900903522CV
Judge Frank G. Noal

Dafandanta•

STATE 07 TEXAS

)
I aa.
COUNTY OF DALLAS
>
I, ALLEN J. MERIL, having first baan aworn, atata undar oath!
1. I an a citizen of tha united States of America, a resident
of tha State of Taxaa, and of the County of Dallaa, and an and have
baan at all relevant tines a physician, radical doctor and aurgaon
licensed by and practicing in tha Stata of Texas,
2. I have baan Mr. William V. Panney'a ("Mr. Penney's")
phyaioian and surgeon ainca 196$ regarding spina injuries resulting
from an automobile aaoidant in that ease year.
3. Surgery was performed on Mr. Penney'a naofc in 1967 and
again in 198S. Although aware of injuries to the lower apina and
in tha cheat area, a oonservativa approach using alternatives to
surgery were taXan dua to the oritical nature of the areas injured.
4. As his oondition continued to deteriorate, new M.R.I,
teohnoiogy was uaad to identify Bpecifio areas requiring aurgioal
intervention. Surgery on tha low back was performed on 11-13-91
See attached report, where electronic bone grovth simulators and
mechanical support devices vsre installed.
9. Subsequently, Mr, Penney's recovery reached a point to
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where ha vas strong though that ha vas rafsrrsd to spaoialiats for
•valuation of tha chest spins condition. After svaluation by Andri
Critrom, M»D. ( Orthopedic Surgeon/Chest Speoialiat), Walter
Bobechoo, M.D. ( Orthopedic Surgeon/Tumor Specialist), and Michael
Mack, M.D. ( Thoracic Surgeon/Cardiac Specialist) surgery vaa
scheduled for Mr. Pannay at Medical City Hospital in Dallas, Texas
in March of 1993/ see attached report.
6. Mr Penney began phyaioal therapy again after an extended
period of in hone nursing support. During his recovery and
physical therapy period, Mr. Psnnay broke ons of tha rode of the
mechanical support davics that had been previously installed during
the low baok surgery, Mr. Pannay had not recovered from tha chest
surgery to a point where it vas advisable to operate on tha lov
baok again. He vas advissd to stop all physical therapy and
activity until ha had recovered enough and vas strong enough for
surgery to be scheduled.
7. Mr. Penney, hovever, insisted on traveling to salt Lake
city, Utah in order to attend a meeting with a judge presiding over
a litigation that he vas a party to. The surgery vas scheduled
after his trip. Fortunately, no further damage vas oaueed due to
his travels and surgery vaa performed at Garland Community Hospital
in August of 1992, sse attached report. Tha surgery vas performed
and tha broken rod, the alectronios for the bone growth stimulator,
and tha other mechanical support devices were removed. Since that
time Mr, Penney has experienced significant pain from both the low
back and the chest conditions and still takes a aignifleant amount
of medication for his physical as veil as psychological conditions.
8. It la my opinion that Mr. Penney's physical and mental
condition would have had a negative affect on his ability to
participate in the discovery process of a litigation. The combined
affeata of his pain, trauma, and mediaation would have a profound
negative affect on his ability to think and funotion normally. At
present his lover spine is progressing slowly as a result of ongoing phyaiosl therapy, but Mr. Penney still has limited physioal
and mental capabilities due to his chest/spine condition and the
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oumulativa affacta of hia pravieua aurgariaa*
9. X hava known Mr* Fannay ainoa 1972 and parforaad a spina
fuaion in 1976 that halpad him raoovar oonplataly fron a dlaabled
condition to becoaa « productiva member of sooiaty again* I know
hin to ba -an honaat parson who sets poaitiva goala and follows his
phyaicians' instruotions.
FURTHER AFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
DATED this
_ day of Fabruary, 1993.

Allan J. HerilT M.D.
x'B^fiBCR'IBED-AND SWORK to bafora ma, a notary public on tha
)py^'
d*y. of, February, 1993.
s

i

j ^ \ ^*^V;;^* S\ VS^OSLA^
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My commission axpiraai

Raaiding a t ^ V ^ C L O
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L..1
2696 W. Walnut S t r e e t
Garland, Texas 75042
214/276-7116

COMMUNITY
HOSPITAL

^ULaLS^2^m

PENNEY, WILLIAM

1-19710-2

ALLEN J. MERIL, M.D.

TATE OF OPERATIONi

11/13/91

OPERATIVE NOTE

PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSISi

1.

POSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS!

Same.

OPERATION PERFORMED:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Disk disruption syndrome L3-4, L4-5.

Repeat bilateral laminectomy, excision
of disk L3-4, L4-5.
Posterior lumbar interbody fusion with
EBI implantable stimulator L3-4, L45.
Segmental fixation with Harm's device
L3-4, L4-5.
Insertion of epidural catheter for
continuous
epidural
Fentanyl
administration.

SURGEON;

Dr. Meril

ASSISTANT SURGEONi

Dr. Whelan

?, A. ASSISTANT:

Steve Allen, A. Geiger

ANESTHESIA.'
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDUREi
Patient was prepped and draped in a
sterile
manner.
Previous
midline
incision
was
utilized.
Paravertebral musculature was stripped bilaterally from L3-4, L4-5interlaminar spaces under image intensifier control to correctly
identify the proper spaces. A generous bilateral laminectomy and
partial facetectomy was carried out at L3-4 and L4-5 in anticipation
of the posterior lumbar interbody fusion. Moderately bulging disks
were encountered at both L3-4, L4-5 and postoperative change most
marked at L4-5 left. The disk was entered with a #15 blade, and with
graduated pituitary rongeurs, curettes, and high speed bur, a
thorough diskectomy was accomplished. Then, a pilot hole was started
with a #0 starter, and then with high speed burs and the Anspach end
cutter, circular troughs were made bilaterally at L3-4, L4-5 for the
posterior lumbar interbody fusion. Four patellar grafts were taken
and trimmed to appropriate size, and then longitudinal troughs were
placed sibout ^ach graft, and a single diagonal hole was placed within
•>ach graft.
The EBI units times two were tested, found to be active. Cathode was
then threaded in and around each of the four grafts. Then, each
(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)
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graft uas gently tamped into place first at the L4-5 left, and then
L3-4.
Then similarly, the grafts on the right were gently tamped
into place. Surgicel v;as placed over the exposed grafts, and the
cathodes were packed to the lateral wall, and there was no contact
noted with the dura or nerve roots.
Then, the junction of the transverse process pedicles were identified
at the pedicle of L3-4 and L5. With a high speed bur, this area was
^corticated, exposing cancellous bone within the pedicle,
Then,
under image intensifier control, gear shift was utilized and each
pedicle was probed. Pedicles were tapped, and then 4 cm. screws were
utilized at all levels, and were advanced under image intensifier
control. Then, a bar was taken and trimmed to appropriate size, and
placed into the slotted heads of the screws, and then the nuts were
tightened, giving excellent stability.
A tunnel was then made under the retained lamina of L3, and througfi
a separate
stab wound,
an epidural
catheter was
introduced
approximately 10 cm. from distal to proximal for continuous epidural
Fentanyl administration.
Free fat grafts *fere placed over the exposed dura, and the wound was
irrigated again. It had been irrigated throughout the procedure with
triple antibiotic solution. The wound was then closed in layers, and
~.\e patient was returned to Recovery Ward in good condition.
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PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS:

HamanytoM of T7 v e r t e b r a l body.

POSTOPSRATITE DIA5N0SI8*

Hemangioma of T7 v e r t e b r a l body.

COS URGE ONS;

i n d r e l Cxitram, M#D. ( A a a l a t a n t : S r , Bobechko)
V a l t a r Bobechko, M*D. (As ei a t e n t : Dr. C a i t r o a )
Michael Mack, M.D. ( A a a l a t a n t ; Dr« CaifcrooO

QPHtATION PBUTOSMEDI

V e r t e b r a l corpactomy o f T7 w i t h r a d i c a l a t c i H o a
o f hemangioma through t r a n s t h o r a c i c approach
w i t h decompreeeioa o f t h e a p i n a l c o r d .

ANESTHESIA;

General.

AMESTHSSIOLOOISTs

Donald L» Drennon* M . D .

CLINICAL NOTEi
Mr. Penney l a a 49-year-old man who baa had
chronic mid thoracic back pain aacondary ta>a hewngiotte i n the jbody of T7 for
several yeera* The pain came on a f t e r a motor vehicle accident; in 1988. The
patient underwent cerrioal fuaiona and lumbar fuaiona which eredicated hie
c e r v i c a l and lumbar pain, and ha waa l e f t with a mldtboracic pain. He wee
admitted a l e c t l v e l y for e transthoracic reaactLon of the symptomatic
hemangioma in the T7 vertebra.
DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION:
Procedure involved Dr. Michael Mack who
performed a thoracotomy for axpoeure. Dr. Andrei Czitrom performed the
vertebral COtpectomy of 17 by transthoracic approach with decompression of the
apinal cord* Dr, Bobachko performed the intararthrodaaie and a t a b i l l s a t i o n s
of the eplae, Thle note w i l l only document the procedure performed by Dr.
Cxitrom, which i a the vertebral corpactomy of T7.
I t should be noted that Dr. Ctitrom aaaiated Dr. Bobechko and Dti Bobechko
a s s i s t e d Dr. Caitrom during t h e i r reepective part of the operative procedure.
The p e t i t a t wai positioned on the table in t h e right l a t e r a l poaition and the
l e f t thoracotomy waa carried out by Dr« Michael Meckv After a*po*ure of the
aplna by thoracotomy and the l i g a t i o n of the three segmental veaaela in the
area of T7» T8 and T6, the vertebral corpactomy was begun* f i r s t by
identifying the l e v a l a with the help of needles placed i n t o the dlak spaces of
what waa thought to be tha T6-7 and the X7-8 disk spaces* X-ray v e r i f i c a t i o n
of tha correct l e v e l waa obtained.
I t should be noted that apinal cord monitoring waa need throughout t h i s
procedure. The 6th r i b had haen removed by Dr* Michael Mack and thle provided
e x c e l l e n t exposure of the l e v e l of T6, T7 and T8.
A longitudinal i n c i s i o n wee mada through the perioBtaum at tha l e v e l of T6, T7
and T8» and tha periosteum waa r e f l e c t e d anteriorly with the help of
e l e v a t o r s . Bleeding waa controlled with electrocautery and with the Argon
beam coagulator. After r e f l e c t i o n of the periosteum* the T7 vertebra
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appeared slightly abnormal -with more bleeding than the adjacent vertebrae* A
small osteotome wae used to cut a window in the vertebra, sod following thie,
a curette waa uaad to acoop out the bone of the vertebra until the abnormal
tiseue wea encountered, which appeared to be sore fatty*looking and was
bleeding quite briskly* Hemostasia was achieved at each steps using tha Argon
beast coagulate?, ae well as Surgical and Gelfoa* soaked with thrombin.
The level was again identified after the initial window waa made by placing a
vascular clip Into the vertebra, and again verifying that the correct level
waa operated on, which waa T7,
Tha MRI previously ahowed that the left aide of T7 was Involved, including the
pedicle* Careful removal*of hone wee carried out, beginning from the
midvertebre towards the posterior aspect of the vertebra, using curat tea,
JCerrison rongpure, aa well as pituitary rongeurs*
After meticulous dissection and quite frectuent intervals, during which
hemostaals waa carried out, the abnormal tissue was removed bit by bit from
the posterior aspect of the vertebral body of T7* The pedicle was also
removed and thie ultimately led to the entrance into the spinel canal. The
dure waa exposed gradually, and the spinal cord waa decompressed of the
mixture of heimngioma, tissue and bony tissue that was present In the area*
The removal continued end the disk betwwen T6-T7 and T7-T8 wee removed. The
dura waa decompreaeed circumferentially and a nerve probe could be placed into
the spinal canal, up and down, without any difficulty at the end of the
deoompreaelon. The vertebral body bleeding was controlled with Surgical and
Gelfoam packs using thrombin and adrenalin*
During the procedure, the Cell 8aver wea uaad and a total of 2 unite waa
relnfused into the patient* One unit of autologous blood waa also reinfueed
during the procedure.
After the entire decompression waa completed and heooetaaiB waa accomplished,
Dr« Bobechko proceeded to carry out the reconstruction, using a rib graft for
arthrodesis and anterior spinal plating using tha Alps pitting system. This
part of the procedure will be described in a separate report by pr, Bobechko*
At the end of the reconetruction, during whichfir.Caitrom assisted Dr*
Bobechko, the hemostasia waa again completed end a Marl ex mesh was attached to
the parietal pleura, in erdar to cover the plate and the bolts, and protect
the eorta from them.
At the end of this, Dr» Michael Mac* proceeded to cloae the cheat, *rt
described in a separate report*

thie la

The procedure waa carried out without any coaplicetione with a total blood
loss of approximately 2,000 cc* Patient waa tranafuaed one autologous unit
and was given back 2 units through the Cell sever.
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He returned t o tbt tmovry
l o w 1A wrceUtnt condition sad the spinal cord
•onitoring stayed stable throughout the procedure.

Andrei Csitroa, M.D«
AC/»«7
D: 03/10/92
T: 03/11/92
5945R
ee: 3 copies to Dr. Critroa
Walter Bobechko, M.D.
Michaal Mac*, M.D.
Jon Blacalty, M.D.
Allen Jfartl, K.U, (Garland)
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DATE OF OPERATION;

8-19-92

PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS:

1.

POSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS:

Same.

OPERATION PERFORMED:

1.

SURGEON:

Dr. Meril,

ASSISTANT:

Dr. Whelan

PA ASSISTANT:

Steve Allen, P.A.

ALLEN MERIL, M.D.
OPERATIVE NOTE

Status
post
posterior
interbody
fusion, L3-4 and L4-5, with retained
fractured Harm's device and EBI
generators x 2*

Removal of fractured Harm's device,
L3-4 and L4-5, and explant EBI bone
generators x 2.

ANESTHESIA:
TECHNIQUE: The patient was prepped and draped in the sterile manner.
The anesthesiologist
had placed
an epidural
catheter for
postoperative Fentanyl; however, the catheter was placed too low
necessitating removal of the catheter, reprepping and redraping this
patient. The previous incision was then utilized. The paravertebral
musculature was stripped from the inter laminar spaces at L3-4 and L45, and the Harm's device was circumscribed with the high-speed Onspa
side cutter*
The nuts were backed off one by one. The bar was
removed, and all three screws were removed from the pedicles. The
EBI generators had been placed on both sides of the spinous processes
at approximately L2 where this area was explored* The EBI generators
were exposed and circumscribed. Each was removed, and the wires were
cut.
The wound was copiously irrigated with double-antibiotic
solution, and then closed in layers. The patient was returned to the
Recovery Ward in good condition.
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